August 2012


Egypt, according to seasoned Middle East diplomat Dennis Ross, is living in denial. Ross says in an op ed in the Washington Post that Egyptian President Moursi and the Muslim Brotherhood are denying reality by disavowing sending a response message to Israeli President Perez’s note even while bowing to pragmatic pressures by reversing its stance on accepting IMF assistance. From this, Ross interprets a dangerous “alternative reality” forming in the mindset of the Brotherhood; something for the US to steadfastly confront in its dealings with the new government.

What conclusions should be drawn about an organization that cannot admit the truth? That insists on living in its own reality? If nothing else, it’s clear that the group the Brotherhood [sic] is wedded to its ideology and cannot admit anything that might call its basic philosophy into question.

What conclusions should be drawn about an organization that cannot admit the truth? Possibly that they are in politics?

Not being able to admit fault in its central tenets is a quality of ideology—political or religious—to be sure, but public statements disavowing unpopular but pragmatic actions is also the hallmark of politics. That the Brotherhood is unused to playing such politics and may stumble embarrassingly upon occasion is to be expected. One could point to any number of incidents in American politics as proof of either party in the US insisting on living in its own reality despite overwhelming evidence of “truth” to the contrary.

Ross is, of course, a diplomat, and his overall point is that the US should not tolerate actions or statements by foreign powers that it doesn’t agree with. Particularly as the Moursi government is in the process of forming what Egyptian politics is the mean, this is a critical period in which to establish the bases of the bilateral relationship and the US should take a hard stand now or lose the ability to do so later on.

Fair enough, but his chosen argument is a poor one. Most other states contend that the US doesn’t abide by the arbitrary rules it sets for others, that it punishes others for unfair trade relations while enacting protectionist measures at home, that it insists upon democratic reforms abroad while stifling dissent at home and supporting friendly dictatorships around the world.

And what conclusions should be drawn about a state that cannot admit the truth but insists on living in its own reality?

Politics as usual.

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Just as I was at long last getting ready to turn my attention to Libya and Tunisia – the forgotten but oh-so-important arena of the Arab Spring – Egypt thrusts itself back into the limelight. And even though I feel we pay too much attention to Egypt when it comes to understanding the wave of revolutions sweeping through the region, I like everyone else, must pay heed.

Over the weekend, Egyptian president Moursi at least rhetorically, if not in actuality, dismissed the military junta controlling the state and took the reigns for himself. Questions abound. Thankfully, Marc Lynch does a superb job asking those questions, if not always in answering them.

Abu Aardvark asks here:

were Tantawi and Anan consulted, or did they find out on TV?  did junior officers collude with the Presidents office, or were they equally surprised?  And the behavior of key actors in the coming weeks will shed light on their intentions this weekend:  does Morsi move to impose an Islamist vision or reach out to create a broadly based constitutional convention?  does the military strike back in some form?

There’s no way to answer those questions just now, alas, but as Lynch states, the truth will trickle out. In lieu of comprehensive answers, he proposes three routes along which events might unfold:

1) Those who believe the SCAF remains fully in control see a clever scheme to cement long-term military rule in alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood by gently dumping the unpopular figureheads while retaining an institutional hold on power. 

2) Those who fear the Muslim Brotherhood see the makings of a full-scale Ikhwanization of Egypt, with Morsi seizing dictatorial powers, brushing aside the secular bastion of the SCAF, and putting himself in place to shape the new constitution.   

3) And those who still see the prospect for some kind of real democratic transition can find some comfort in an elected President removing the senior leaders of the outgoing military junta without a bloody fight and asserting the principle of political control by an elected President.

This “long, grinding war of institutional position,” as he states, will take time to play out and much of the action will necessarily be out of sight.

Been away for some time as part of a major move, but slowly settling into things. While there’s been a lot of news coverage on the region, there’s been little to alter any of the previous questions – no major game changers. If anything, the situation in Egypt confirms that the Muslim Brotherhood, the Moursi government, and the SCAF have found (or are finding) a way to live together. That’s good for the country, though we will have to wait and see how good that will prove for Egyptians or others (read: the United States).
In the meantime, here is a decent, if somewhat superficial, rundown of the major figures in the Brotherhood. Many questions surround each of them.